The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, 
Islamist organization and its affiliates. In the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance,
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, clearly indicates the U.S. priority for defeating this transnational organization. "It [the Joint Force] will preserve our ability to conduct the missions we judge most important to protecting core national interests: defeating alQa`ida and its affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts." 8 The U.S. government, influenced by a secular tradition of separating church and state, is challenged by the intersections between the role of religion in foreign policy and the demand to deal with faith-based tensions and significant conflicts around the world, particularly al-Qa`ida. In a 2007 interview, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright provided insight to reasons for this challenge when asked why diplomats and world leaders are "tone deaf"
to the power of religion:
It's not a matter of not understanding or having their own personal faith. But, what had happened is that I think there was a sense that certain conflicts were so complicated, that to bring God and religion into them was an additional complicating factor, because there were so many diverse ideas. And if there's one thing that always gets people excited, it's their different interpretations of religion. So, the best thing people thought was, you know, this is hard enough. Let's not bring God and religion into it. 9 Secretary Albright further commented, "And, I feel especially now that the opposite needs to be true--is that in order to try to resolve conflicts we need to find the common aspects of the three great Abrahamic religions." 10 The Secretary's response, albeit an informing perspective from the former highest-ranking U.S. diplomat, is simple and intuitive when considering the challenges of incorporating faith in a national policy approach, particularly to religious issues and conflicts. Her insight, however, uniquely highlights the underlying U.S. policy approach to complex religious issues, specifically al-Qa`ida and religious extremism over the last twelve years-an approach that overwhelmingly "leaves God and religion out of it." This research paper advocates a 3 faith-based policy approach to marginalizing al-Qa`ida: first, addressing shortfalls and limitations in past and current national policy; second, characterizing the current global nature of the al-Qa`ida organization, including its theology and ideology; and, third, characterizes al-Qa`ida as "the self-anointed foot soldiers of God, embroiled in a divine cosmic struggle between good and evil, the righteous and the sinful, Islamic truth and western ignorance." 12 Wiktorowicz assessed the Bush administration response a year following the September 11, 2001 attacks as too narrowly focused: "The U.S. response targeted radical Islamic terrorists who, as President Bush put it, were 'traitors to their own faith, trying in effect, to hijack Islam itself." 13 He further comments that President
Bush, and other world leaders, dismissed al-Qaeda as part of the "lunatic fringe, outside the boundaries of Islam," resulting in a prevailing national strategy designed to kill or immobilize the "violent religious usurpers and so end terrorism." 14 Wiktorowicz presciently foresaw enduring challenges and complexities in U.S. attempts to defeat alQa`ida. He surmised: "If al-Qaeda is dismantled as an organized enterprise, will Islamic terrorism disappear? The administration seems to think so, and is betting its future national security on an anti-terrorism policy directed at destroying al-Qaeda's infrastructure and eliminating its leadership." 15 Wiktorowicz additionally explained that an enemy like al-Qa`ida is not eradicated through military operations and law enforcement dragnets alone, since there are others to assume the place of the fallen.
Wiktorowicz concludes the violent true believer is only stopped if the ideas nurturing violence and terrorism are discredited. 16 Comparing the 2002 and 2010 NSS reveals alQa`ida remains resilient and not as easy to eradicate as previously assumed.
Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia. 17 -2002 NSS Afghanistan and Pakistan: This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al-Qa`ida. The danger from this region will only grow if its security slides backward, the Taliban controls large swaths of Afghanistan, and al-Qa`ida is allowed to operate with impunity. 18 Naji's strategy advocates long-term guerilla warfare, targeting ungoverned spaces and eventually establishing shadow government structures supporting Islamic law. The method of al-Qa`ida is to contest government control of areas by exhausting the security forces and national will of the government through guerilla warfare and subsequent expansion of territory. 42 Ironically, the Arab Spring has undermined this strategy. AQ moves into remote areas, creates alliances with local traditional communities, exports violence that prompts a Western intervention and then exploits the backlash against that intervention in order to generate support for its Takfiri agenda. Al Qa`ida's ideology tends to lack intrinsic appeal for traditional societies, and so draws the majority of its strength from this backlash, rather than from general popular support. When groups embrace al Qaeda's "far enemy" logic, they are also embracing strategic absurdity. Terrorist groups that succeed politically, like Hezbollah and Hamas, are firmly anchored in local realities and politics and their success comes in part because their ambitions are limited. Not so with al Qaeda. Al Qaeda may preach that the regimes in Riyadh, Cairo, and Algiers are held in place by U.S. troops and influence, but the reality is that these governments have their own ruthless security services and means of buying off rivals that help them ensure their grip on power even if Washington abandons them. The most vexing dilemma for U.S. counterterrorism policy, however, concerns groups that may be moving toward al Qaeda but have not yet made the leap. Many al Qaeda affiliates always hated the United States and its allies, but their focus was local for many years. Because the groups had some ties to al Qaeda, George W. Bush's and Barrack Obama's administration began to target them and encourage others to do so. As a result, the groups became more anti-American, creating a vicious circle. But taking them on may mean driving some deeper into al Qaeda's fold-and making the terrorist threat all the more dangerous." 74 Byman surrenders to the fact there is "no one-size-fits-all strategy" for marginalization of al-Qaida and its regional affiliates around the world; however he does argue for the implementation of a principal element of any good counterinsurgency strategy: "In all these cases, however, the United States should strive to separate the locals from the al Qaeda core." 75 It is the locals in these regions, in many instances Salafis, as previously discussed, who teeter on the edge of joining jihad organizations and subsequently decide to remain "local" or join al-Qa`ida and pursue "global" jihad objectives. Byman concludes his article summarizing that the organization's current merger strategy is a double-edged sword: al-Qa`ida gains from its acquisitions, but can also be hurt by them. 76 Leveraging this juxtaposition, an aggressive faith-based policy provides an alternative or, minimally, a compliment to the current attrition-based U.S. policy, presently yielding short-term success but long-term adverse consequences.
Faith-Based Initiatives and Recommendations
Framing the Problem-Solution Today's most important security threat involving religion is, of course, the global terrorist/insurgent network led by Al Qaeda and its ilk. The U.S. response has been to pursue (1) hard-power approaches (military, law enforcement, and intelligence measures focusing on preventing a particular action-terrorist violence), and (2) broader efforts in conflict prevention, counterinsurgency, and democratic nation building. Unfortunately, in practice the U.S. has overemphasized the former and underemphasized the latter. 77 The authors further suggest a "more balanced and effective approach" would employ military means as one component of a combination of all elements of national and international power. This combination, Farr and Dennis explain, must include "smart" diplomacy and solutions to the critical problems of religious and secular authority. 78 While indicating U.S. counterterrorism and democracy promotion strategies have only had "some" and "limited" success respectively, neither of these strategies integrated an appropriate focus of religion and religious freedom. 79 Three years later, in 2012, Farr contributed to an additional monograph, authored by Timothy Shah, titled, Religious
Freedom. In the monograph's executive summary, the reader quickly understands that Farr and Dennis' 2009 recommendation for a "more balanced and effective approach" in combing elements of national power to address issues of religious authority has lingered or largely gone ignored:
Religious freedom is under sustained pressure today around the world. In some places it is fair to say that religious freedom is under siege. Although scant attention is paid by governments . . . the implication of the crisisand we contend that it is a crisis-are quite serious. A worldwide erosion of religious freedom is causing large-scale human suffering, grave injustice, and significant threats to international peace and security. 80 Moreover, the authors contend it is essential to recognize that a crucial contributor to the religious radicalism giving rise to al-Qa`ida is the political repression and manipulation of Islam endemic in many Muslim-majority societies. 81 The argument, therefore, is if religious repression radicalizes and destabilizes, religious freedom counter-radicalizes and stabilizes. 82 Logically then, religious freedom should be considered an essential component in any effective long-term strategy for weakening radical religious movements.
83
Contributing to the paper's early definition and discussion of religion and law, the discussion of religious freedom is explained, by Shah, as the "freedom to speak and act-both individually and in community with others-in ways that express whatever truths one may possess about transcendent order." 84 Furthermore, religious freedom is explained as the right to form political parties, or to espouse public arguments, on the basis of religious teaching. 85 The unfortunate and ugly irony to this is al-Qa`ida's theological and ideological determined insistence that western influences and actions- Faith-based diplomacy, according to author Douglas Johnston, incorporates religious considerations into the practice of international politics. At the operational level, faith-based diplomacy makes religion part of the solution to "intractable, identity-based conflicts," escaping the reach of traditional diplomacy. 89 Johnston posits,
A distinguishing characteristic of faith-based diplomacy is the fact that it is more about reconciliation than the absence of conflict. It is about restoring respectful relationships between the parties through a broader array of roles from those normally associated with traditional diplomacy-from impartial observer to message carrier, emphatic advocate, or activist.
Common to all forms of its practice is the commitment to capitalize on the positive role that religious leaders and institutions can play in building trust and overcoming differences. They can serve as instruments of change by exercising their moral authority, their commitment to nonviolence, and their ability to inspire communities. 90 Johnston separates those most capable and best credentialed to execute the groundwork, literally and figuratively, of a faith-based approach: "faith-based diplomacy is not well suited for government practitioners. In the West, constraints relating to separation of church and state get in the way; and elsewhere a government's political agenda inevitably compromises the kind of balanced neutrality that is normally required to succeed." 91 Thus, Johnston explains, religious leaders themselves or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), equipped for the responsibility, must take on the task. It is the government's responsibility to then reinforce the process or build upon as circumstances permit. 92 Part of reinforcing the process begins with the President setting the tone and broaching policy guidance to government organizations responsible for developing and executing faith-based diplomacy.
National Security Strategy
First, and most importantly, the President must revise the current NSS portrayal of al-Qa`ida into a thorough, albeit succinct, and accurate representation of the organization's theology, ideology, and structure, including the dynamics and interrelationships of affiliate organizations. As the ultimate document for national security policy, the NSS provides guidance for subordinate agencies to develop supporting strategies. Accurately broadening the portrayal of al-Qa`ida-through rootcause determination and understanding of true believer and organization motivations and aims-into national-level policy and strategy documents, inherently expands the aperture of opportunities to disrupt or marginalize the organization through a faith-based diplomatic approach.
The NSS must also emphasize the importance of promoting religious freedom worldwide. Timothy Shah argues religious freedom is an essential element in "any effective long-term strategy for weakening radical religious movements." 93 
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 Give religious freedom policymakers sufficient resources.
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 Mandate, the president's letter of instruction to U.S. ambassadors, the allocation of embassy resources to engage religious actors, ideas, and communities and to advance religious freedom broadly understood.
 Support via foreign aid and democracy funding, religious and secular nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world that seek to advance religious freedom as part of democratic development.
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 Encourage the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom to continue to expand its efforts to study the effects of religious freedom on religious extremism. 107 As previously discussed the Arab Spring has served as a springboard for democratic development and reform in many Muslim nations and has subsequently unleashed the Salafis as a new political force. Generally, the Salafis maintain they are promoting the purest alternative to the dictatorships long dominating the regions. 108 Many Muslims see it differently, however, labeling ultra-conservative Salafis as bullies who threaten others unwilling to share their rigid beliefs. 109 NGOs to aid in marginalizing al-Qa`ida's ability to influence or coerce local populations.
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